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Confronting Williams: The Confrontation 
Clause and Forensic Witnesses in the  
Post-Williams Era 
Taryn Jones* 
In Williams v. Illinois, the division of the U.S. Supreme Court created substantial 
confusion as to the proper application of the Confrontation Clause to forensic witnesses. 
In the decision, the Court affirmed the conviction of the defendant, Sandy Williams, 
because the plurality and Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, determined that the DNA 
profile produced by an outside laboratory was not testimonial and thus Williams did not 
have a constitutional right to cross-examine the laboratory analysts. The plurality and the 
concurrence, however, presented two distinct rationales for deeming the report 
nontestimonial. The case has consequently left lower courts without firm guidance as to 
when forensic reports are testimonial. 
 
This Note critically examines two state responses to the testimonial nature of autopsy 
reports following the confusion created by the Williams decision, and whether testimony 
of surrogate witnesses on these reports under the current legal interpretation violates the 
Confrontation Clause. 
 
I will argue that this confusion creates a demand for judicial restraint. Courts should err 
on the side of excluding evidence in order to preserve the Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right. 
 
 * Production Editor, Hastings Law Journal; J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California 
Hastings College of the Law. Thank you to the staff of the Hastings Law Journal for all of their work 
on this Note. Thank you also to my family and loved ones for their patience and unwavering support. 
And a special thank you to Sean Timm for lending me his strength whenever mine began to fail. 
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The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees that 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”1 The clause generally 
prohibits the use of out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted when the declarant is unavailable to testify.2 By 
requiring that a witness present her evidence on the stand and be subject 
to cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause gives a defendant the 
opportunity to probe into the potential deficiencies of a witness’ 
testimony.3 As a result, this right gives criminal defendants the 
opportunity to show the potential incompetence of a witness or to 
awaken the conscience of a fraudulent one.4 Accordingly, the protections 
provided by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment are 
 
 1. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
 2. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004). 
 3. Sixth Amendment at Trial, 34 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 594, 604–05 (2005). 
 4. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318–19 (2009). 
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critical to ensuring the right to a fair trial. Courts, however, have steadily 
eroded this right.5 
In particular, the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Williams v. 
Illinois critically diminished a defendant’s right to cross-examine forensic 
witnesses.6 There, a plurality of the Court determined that the lab 
technician from an independent laboratory, which ran the original DNA 
sample found on the victim, was not required to testify because the 
results were not testimonial.7 Instead, the sole testimony of the Illinois 
State Police forensic specialist who matched the defendant’s DNA 
sample to the independent report was sufficient,8 and accordingly, the 
defendant had no right to confront the independent lab technician who 
ran the initial test.9 As a whole, the Williams plurality provided little 
guidance to lower courts as to when forensic evidence must be submitted 
by those directly responsible for its production or when it can be 
submitted by other “surrogate”10 witnesses.11 Consequently, as courts 
have interpreted the decision in a variety of ways,12 the diverse 
applications of Williams have left defendants vulnerable to inconsistent 
and unpredictable applications of the Confrontation Clause. 
This Note explores the confusion resulting from the split of the 
Williams Court and concludes that these uncertainties demand judicial 
restraint and deference to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right. Part I will explore the pre-Williams decisions that 
developed the “testimonial”13 doctrine which now lies at the center of the 
 
 5. See John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, 
and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 191, 220 (1999) (describing the 
Confrontation Clause as a “shrinking right” and explaining that this shrinking trend is due to judicial 
concerns regarding the “all-or-nothing choice the rule imposes”). 
 6. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
 7. Id. at 2228. 
 8. Id. at 2227–28. 
 9. Id. 
 10. For the purposes of this Note, a surrogate witness or surrogate testimony will refer to a 
witness or testimony presented by an individual who had little or no involvement in the production of 
the forensic evidence presented at trial. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011) 
(denying surrogate testimony by “a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe 
the test reported in the certification”); see also Marc D. Ginsberg, The Confrontation Clause and 
Forensic Autopsy Reports—A “Testimonial,” 74 La. L. Rev. 117, 121 (2013) (explaining that forensic 
pathology results can be presented by “the examining pathologist—the pathologist who performed the 
forensic autopsy on the victim and prepared the autopsy report” or presented by “a ‘surrogate’ 
pathologist, one who was not the examining pathologist, from the office of the coroner or medical 
examiner”). 
 11. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[The plurality has] left significant 
confusion in their wake.”). 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (determining that Williams 
created no binding precedence); State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 437 (N.M. 2013) (calculating which 
principles five justices could agree upon). 
 13. Testimonial statements, defined by Crawford v. Washington and its progeny as formal 
statements or those statements given in preparation for trial, give rise to the Confrontation Clause and 
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Confrontation Clause discussion, while Part II will examine forensic 
science in the context of wrongful convictions. Scholars have emphasized 
the danger of faulty forensic science14 and this Note will echo these 
concerns, which strongly suggest that forensic science does not warrant 
the amount of reverence it typically receives from courts. Because cross-
examination is an essential safeguard against wrongful convictions, 
forensic scientists do not warrant special treatment with regard to 
confrontation rights. 
Part III will present Williams v. Illinois. As this case is of particular 
importance to the discussion of forensic witnesses, it is discussed in three 
parts: (1) the underlying facts; (2) the conflict between the plurality, 
Justice Thomas’ concurrence, and the dissent; and (3) a brief 
introduction to the resulting confusion among lower courts. Part IV then 
reviews two state cases15—People v. Dungo and State v. Navarette—that 
attempted to deal with the Confrontation Clause in the aftermath of 
Williams. Both cases addressed the admissibility of testimony regarding 
autopsies presented by surrogate pathologists either not directly 
responsible, or entirely uninvolved, in the autopsy itself.16 Both cases 
dealt with similar facts, and yet, reached contrary results on whether the 
forensic evidence was admissible, emphasizing the malleability of the 
Williams decision. These decisions further demonstrate that Williams has 
left defendants unduly vulnerable to inconsistent applications of the 
Sixth Amendment. This Note recommends that judges err on the side of 
exclusion of forensic evidence submitted by a witness not directly 
involved in its production. This is necessary to reduce the risk of 
wrongful convictions resulting from inconsistent applications of Williams 
and to preserve a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  
I.  The Confrontation Clause Before WILLIAMS 
Part I discusses the development of the “testimonial” standard 
introduced in Crawford v. Washington, which requires that defendants be 
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses whose statements 
are either formal or given under circumstances where their use at trial 
would be reasonably foreseeable.17 It will also address the establishment 
 
its protections. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004); see infra Part I. By “testimonial 
doctrine,” this Note refers to these guiding cases and the standard for determining whether a 
statement is testimonial, as described therein. 
 14. See generally Barry Scheck et al., Actual Innocence: When Justice Goes Wrong and 
How to Make It Right (2003) (detailing real-life stories of how DNA testing has often destroyed 
supposed solid evidence that condemned people to death). 
 15. Because the Confrontation Clause was incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
right extends to state prosecutions. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52. 
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of the “primary purpose” inquiry into the testimonial standard.18 
Pursuant to the primary purpose test a statement may not be testimonial 
if its primary purpose was not for prosecution even where its use at trial 
was foreseeable.19 Part I will then discuss the application of these 
standards in the context of forensic science both in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, which determined that the 
defendant has the right to confront the forensic scientist directly 
responsible for the production of results.20 
A. Background Leading up to WILLIAMS 
The Confrontation Clause provides a criminal defendant the right to 
cross-examine an adverse witness.21 The admission of hearsay evidence 
implicates this right because the defendant must be afforded the 
opportunity to confront the out-of-court declarant.22 Under the hearsay 
rule, the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the admission of out-of-
court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted,23 absent 
some qualifying exception.24 Whether a statement is “offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted” is admittedly an unclear standard25 that 
even divides the Supreme Court,26 but it generally means statements 
offered into evidence for the truth of their contents.27 The “declarant,” 
meanwhile, is the person who made the statement, which is the oral, 
written, or nonverbal conduct intended as an assertion.28 Ultimately, this 
evidentiary prohibition, coupled with the right to cross-examination, is 
an essential protection against the accusations of noncredible sources. 
 
 18. See infra Part I.B. 
 19. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 20. See infra Subparts I.C. and I.D. 
 21. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
 22. Sixth Amendment at Trial, supra note 3, at 612–13. 
 23. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). 
 24. See Fed. R. Evid. 803, 804, 807. While important to the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements, these exceptions will not be addressed in this Note. 
 25. Jennifer L. Mnookin & David H. Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the 
Confrontation Clause, 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 101 (emphasis added) (“The phrase is more easily 
remembered than understood. What it means to introduce an item of evidence ‘for the truth of the 
matter asserted’ has confused generations of law students, lawyers, and jurists.”).  
 26. See generally Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (disagreeing as to whether the 
Cellmark report was offered for the truth of the matter asserted). 
 27. For example, if the statement “I saw the Queen of England at the mall on February 8th” is 
offered to show that in fact the Queen was at the mall, then the statement is offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted. If, however, the statement is offered as circumstantial evidence to show the 
declarant’s mental state (perhaps the declarant has certain mental delusions), then it is not offered for 
its truth. For an introduction to the hearsay rule, see Roger C. Park, Hearsay from Square One: The 
Definition of Hearsay, CALI, http://www.cali.org/lessons/web/evd08/jq.php#Contents (last visited Apr. 
8, 2016). 
 28. Fed. R. Evid. 801(a)–(b). 
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As finders of fact, juries carry the responsibility of determining 
whether the declarant is a credible source and is telling the truth when 
testifying in court. For instance, the jury may observe the witness’ 
demeanor during cross-examination to determine if that witness is lying.29 
If the jury determines that a witness is not credible, the evidence 
presented by that witness would lose its influence as well. Without this 
vetting process, the reliability of out-of-court statements would be 
relatively unknown and defendants would be susceptible to incompetent 
or fraudulent attacks by out-of-court declarants. 
Overall, the Confrontation Clause, which only applies to criminal 
cases, provides an additional barrier against the admission of such out-of-
court statements by granting defendants the constitutional right to 
confront their accusers.30 A defendant has a right, under the 
Confrontation Clause, to subject a witness to the rigors of the adversarial 
system, probing into the witness’ potential deficiencies in knowledge and 
credibility through cross-examination at trial.31 
Although the clause promises increased protection for defendants, 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in Ohio 
v. Roberts added little to the protections already afforded by the general 
prohibition against hearsay.32 Under Roberts, the Court held that out-of-
court statements were admissible if the declarant was unavailable and the 
statements fell within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception or had 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”33 Moreover, the Court 
even loosened the requirement for unavailability, explaining that a 
“demonstration of unavailability, however, is not always required.”34 The 
Court, therefore, set an extraordinarily low threshold for the admissibility of 
statements of adverse witnesses not subject to cross-examination, and as a 
result, allowed trial judges to use substantial discretion for the admission 
of out-of-court statements. Regardless of the witness’ availability, the 
prosecution could conceivably circumvent the defendant’s confrontation 
right by merely arguing that a statement was trustworthy.35 In light of 
these consequences, the Roberts decision was discarded twenty-four 
years later in Crawford v. Washington.36 
In Crawford, the Court rejected the “trustworthiness” rationale and 
instead adopted a standard to exclude hearsay statements that are 
 
 29. See James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 Cath. U. L. Rev. 903, 911 (2000). 
 30. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
 31. Sixth Amendment at Trial, supra note 3, at 602, 605.  
 32. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (“The historical evidence leaves little doubt, 
however, that the Clause was intended to exclude some hearsay.”). 
 33. Id. at 65–66. 
 34. Id. at 65 n.7 (emphasis added). 
 35. See Peter Nicolas, ‘I’m Dying to Tell You What Happened’: The Admissibility of Testimonial 
Dying Declarations Post-Crawford, 37 Hastings Const. L.Q. 487, 490–91 (2010). 
 36. 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004). 
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deemed “testimonial.”37 By requiring courts to determine the purpose 
and formality of out-of-court statements,38 this standard provided greater 
structure and guidance for lower courts determining the admissibility of 
statements offered without the opportunity for cross-examination. 
Before the Williams decision, Crawford and its progeny developed and 
applied this testimonial standard39 and generally enforced a confrontation 
right that was more robust in nature.40 
B. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
Marking a dramatic shift in Confrontation Clause doctrine,41 the 
Crawford Court rejected the traditional trustworthiness standard42 
established in Ohio v. Roberts. Writing the opinion for the Court, Justice 
Scalia explained, “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is 
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with the jury trial because a 
defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment 
prescribes.”43 
In Crawford, the defendant was charged with assault and attempted 
murder for stabbing a man.44 At trial, the prosecution offered a statement 
made by the defendant’s wife during a police interrogation to refute the 
defendant’s self-defense claim.45 While the defendant claimed that the 
victim had reached for a weapon prior to the fight, the wife, who 
witnessed the stabbing, indicated to the police that she did not believe 
the victim had a weapon.46 Because his wife asserted marital privilege and 
refused to testify at trial,47 the defendant argued that the use of her out-
of-court statement violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront 
“witnesses against him.”48 The Court agreed with him.49 
The Supreme Court determined, in a 7-2 majority, that the 
admissibility of the wife’s out-of-court statement was dependent upon 
the “testimonial” nature of the statement.50 In other words, without the 
opportunity to cross-examine, out-of-court statements would be 
considered inadmissible if they have the quality of “bear[ing] testimony” 
 
 37. Id. at 51. 
 38. See infra notes 52–54. 
 39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60; see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (introducing 
the “primary purpose” analysis to the test for testimonial statements). 
 40. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009). 
 41. See Ginsberg, supra note 10, at 122. 
 42. 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 38. 
 45. Id. at 40. 
 46. Id. at 39–40. 
 47. Id. at 40. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 68. 
 50. Id. at 51. 
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similar to in-court statements.51 The Court continued and established 
three general characterizations for such testimonial statements. First, 
formal statements are commonly held to be testimonial.52 The Court 
explained that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to 
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes 
a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”53 Second, statements 
prepared for prosecution are also generally deemed testimonial.54 If a 
declarant would reasonably believe that her statements would be used in 
a later trial, then the declarant should be subject to cross-examination.55 
Third, the Court held that such out-of-court testimonial statements are 
inadmissible “unless [the declarant] was unavailable to testify, and the 
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”56 This 
narrow exception ensures that the defendant retains the right to confront 
her accusers, even if that confrontation cannot take place before a jury.  
As a result of this doctrine, out-of-court statements closely akin to 
in-court testimony must be subject to cross-examination in order to be 
admissible.57 For example, statements like those made to an investigator 
would be inadmissible without opportunity for cross-examination 
because they “bear testimony” against the defendant. In other words, 
these statements would be considered “testimonial” because they are 
formal (that is, stated to a government official) and are reasonably 
foreseen by the declarant to be used at trial.58 If, however, the declarant 
was unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant, the statements would be admissible.59 
Alternatively, if the statements were nontestimonial, they would not 
invoke Confrontation Clause protection.60 Overall, Crawford provided 
much less discretion for the admissibility of out-of-court statements. 
Under this standard, if statements fell within the categories of “formal” 
or “foreseeable use at trial,” but failed to fall within the narrow 
exceptions of “unavailable” and “prior opportunity to cross-examine,” 
then the statements would be inadmissible regardless of whether the 
judge considered them trustworthy. 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 52. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 54. 
 57. Mark K. Hanasono, The Muddled State: California’s Application of Confrontation Clause 
Jurisprudence in People v. Dungo and People v. Lopez, 41 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 3 (2013). 
 58. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 59. See id. at 54, 59. 
 60. Id. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ 
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law . . . .”). 
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C. DAVIS V. WASHINGTON 
In Davis v. Washington, the Court introduced the “primary 
purpose” test to the testimonial inquiry.61 Under this standard, the Court 
explained that statements made by a declarant having a reasonable 
foreseeability that they will be used in prosecution could still be 
admissible if the primary purpose of those statements was not for use at 
trial.62 The Davis Court held that these types of statements are not 
testimonial and, therefore, do not give rise to the Confrontation Clause.63 
In Davis, a victim of a domestic dispute called 911.64 During the call, 
the 911 operator asked questions that led to statements by the assailant 
and the victim that incriminated the defendant.65 At trial, the victim did 
not testify, and the prosecution instead played the recording of the 911 
call.66 The Court determined that the out-of-court statement was 
admissible, despite the defendant’s inability to cross-examine the victim, 
because the primary purpose of the call was to solicit aid, not to 
investigate for prosecution.67 In the decision, the Court explained, 
“[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency.”68 However, the Court indicated that statements are 
testimonial when “the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution.”69 Consequently, in determining the primary 
purpose of the statements, it is relevant to consider the circumstances 
that gave rise to the statements as well as the intent of both the 
investigator and the declarant.70 
D. MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS 
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court effectively concluded 
that “forensic laboratory reports are testimonial for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause.”71 The defendant in Melendez-Diaz was apprehended 
and detained in the back of a police car,72 and, after the drive to the police 
 
 61. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 829. 
 64. Id. at 817–18. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 819. 
 67. Id. at 822. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Richard D. Friedman, The Sky Is Still Not Falling, 20 J.L. & Pol’y 427, 429 (2012). 
 72. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308 (2009). 
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station, during which the detained made “furtive movements,” officers 
searched the police vehicle and found several bags containing a 
substance resembling cocaine.73 The officers then submitted the bags for 
lab analysis.74 At trial, the prosecution offered three certificates of 
analysis that disclosed the results of the lab testing, which indicated that 
the bags did in fact contain cocaine.75 
The Court determined, following a “rather straightforward 
application” of Crawford,76 that the “affidavits were testimonial 
statements, and the analysts were ‘witnesses’ for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment.”77 After quickly determining the testimonial nature of the 
reports, Justice Scalia systematically presented and rejected the arguments 
given by the dissent.78 For the purposes of this Note, Justice Scalia’s 
rejection of the dissent’s claim that the testimony at issue should be 
admissible because it was the “resul[t] of neutral, scientific testing” is of 
the greatest relevance.79 
Justice Scalia stated that the dissent’s argument was “little more 
than an invitation to return to [the] overruled” trustworthiness standard 
of Roberts, and frankly rejected this reversion.80 He went on to attack the 
merits of the claim,81 and rightfully so. As Richard D. Friedman later 
explained in his article, “[l]ab testing, while usually accurate, is far from 
foolproof. Nor can agents of the government properly be called neutral 
in a criminal prosecution.”82 With deliberate strikes, Justice Scalia 
proceeded to plainly demonstrate the fallibility of forensic science.83 
First, he acknowledged the existence of fraud within the scientific 
community.84 In particular, the opinion emphasized “drylabbing,” a 
practice in which forensic scientists report results to tests that were never 
conducted, as a primary example of fraudulent behavior.85 It is here in 
particular that the Confrontation Clause can bring to light the untruths 
of a forensic witness’ testimony. As Justice Scalia explained, “[w]hile it is 
true, as the dissent notes, that an honest analyst will not alter his 
 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 312. 
 77. Id. at 311. 
 78. Friedman, supra note 71, at 429 (“This gave Justice Scalia a chance to clear away a good deal 
of underbrush, as one by one—quite correctlyhe set these arguments aside.”). 
 79. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 317. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 317–21. 
 82. Friedman, supra note 71, at 430. 
 83. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318–21. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 319; see also Scheck et al., supra note 14, at 140 (“It was powerful evidence, with one 
slight problem: Zain’s laboratory couldn’t perform those tests . . . . He had made up a story to make 
people happy about a suspect.”). 
Jones_15 (Langone).DOCX (Do Not Delete) 5/10/2016  4:21 PM 
May 2016]    CONFRONTING WILLIAMS 1097 
testimony . . . the analyst who provides false results may, under oath in 
open court, reconsider his false testimony.”86 Moreover, he posited that 
confrontation may act to deter fraudulent analysis before the defendant 
is ever even charged and brought to trial.87 
Next, Justice Scalia addressed the possibility of incompetent 
analysts.88 He asserted that confrontation can bring to light an analyst’s 
improper or insufficient training and any deficiencies in judgment.89 
While forensic science, “the gold standard” of evidence, is often viewed 
as purely objective, it involves a great deal of subjective interpretation 
and is therefore subject to human error.90 Moreover, highlighting recent 
DNA exonerations, Justice Scalia also illustrated the existence of faulty 
forensics.91 “[T]he legal community now concedes,” Justice Scalia 
explained, “with varying degrees of urgency, that our system produces 
erroneous convictions based on discredited forensics.”92 Thus, not only is 
science subject to error due to the analyst’s misinterpretations but the 
science presented may not be real “science” at all. These flaws can be 
discovered and presented to the jury upon cross-examination, but only if 
the forensic analyst testifies at trial. The Court reconsidered this decision 
regarding the standard for surrogate testimony just two years later in 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico. 
E. BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO 
Reaffirming the Melendez-Diaz decision, Bullcoming v. New Mexico 
asserted that admitting lab reports through the testimony of a surrogate 
witness violated the Confrontation Clause.93 In Bullcoming, the 
defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated, leading the trial 
court to admit a lab report certifying that his blood alcohol concentration 
was above the legal limit.94 At trial, the prosecution did not call the 
analyst who conducted the tests and prepared the report because he was 
on unpaid leave.95 Instead, a surrogate analyst, who was familiar with the 
lab’s testing, but who “neither observed nor reviewed” the testing of the 
defendant’s blood sample, sponsored the report.96 
The Court rejected the New Mexico Supreme Court’s argument that 
the defendant’s “true accuser” was the machine that the analyst used to 
 
 86. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318–19. 
 87. Id. at 319. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 320. 
 90. Scheck et al., supra note 14, at 157–58. 
 91. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 319. 
 92. Id. (quoting Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 475, 491 (2006)).  
 93. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011). 
 94. Id. at 2709. 
 95. Id. at 2709, 2716. 
 96. Id. at 2712. 
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conduct the test.97 Rather, the Court determined that the analyst, being 
more than a “mere scrivener” of the machine, was the defendant’s 
accuser because the analyst needed specialized skill and knowledge to 
operate the machine and interpret its results.98 Furthermore, the Court 
decided that surrogate testimony was insufficient to demonstrate any 
errors the original analyst might have made,99 asserting:  
[S]urrogate testimony of the kind [the surrogate] was equipped to give 
could not convey what [the analyst] knew or observed about the events 
his certification concerned, [that is,] the particular test and testing 
process he employed. Nor could such surrogate testimony expose any 
lapses or lies on the certifying analyst’s part.100 
Furthermore, the Court determined that the report was formally 
certified and its primary purpose was for use in prosecution.101 The Court 
explained that when a report is “created solely for an ‘evidentiary 
purpose,’” the report “ranks as testimonial.”102 Consequently, the 
surrogate testimony violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights 
because the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine the analyst directly responsible for the results.103 Overall, the 
sheer space for error in forensic analysis leaves far too much room for 
wrongful conviction and fraud. 
II.  Forensic Science and Wrongful Convictions 
To understand such lapses in the perceived sanctity of forensic 
sciences, one need only look to a handful of its failings. On January 22, 
1987, a man in a ski mask, carrying a knife, attacked a young woman.104 
Three weeks later, another woman was attacked, but she was able to see 
her attacker’s reddish-brown beard.105 Glen Dale Woodall was later 
convicted of these crimes, despite conflicting evidence, the victims’ 
hypnotized accusations,106 and Woodall’s unwavering assertion of 
innocence.107  
 
 97. Id. at 2714. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 2715. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 2712 n.6. 
 102. Id. at 2717. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Scheck et al., supra note 14, at 142. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. (“After hypnosis, both victims said that Woodall was their attacker, recognized both by his 
appearance and a singular scent.”). While beyond the scope of this Note, hyponotized accusations or 
confessions are highly controversial and typically inadmissible as evidence. See Daniel R. Webert, 
Note, Are the Courts in a Trance? Approaches to the Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Witness 
Testimony in Light of Empirical Evidence, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1301, 1306–08 (2003). 
 107. Id. at 142–43. 
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The primary witness used in the prosecution’s case-in-chief was Fred 
Salem Zain, the state trooper in charge of serology for Virginia’s crime 
laboratory.108 Zain testified that forensic tests performed on the 
attacker’s and Woodall’s blood and semen proved that “only six in ten 
thousand people could have attacked the woman, and Glen Dale 
Woodall was a member of that very narrow group.”109 However, Zain’s 
laboratory did not have the ability to conduct those tests and, even if he 
could, his statistics, according to a state investigator, were “off by a 
mile.”110 In fact, in this case Zain’s statistics were not just “off”; they were 
outright fabricated.111 Even more alarming, this was not the first time 
Zain had concocted false lab results.112 As the Woodall story came to 
light, the State of Virginia—which convicted Woodall and employed 
Zain—conducted an investigation into Zain’s body of work, and it 
discovered that in a sampling of thirty-six cases Zain had testified in, he 
“faked data in every case.”113 
In this way, forensic science is a double-edged sword. It has the 
ability to help solve crimes and convict the guilty, but it also has the 
capacity to condemn the innocent.114 The story of Zain and his morally 
disastrous career is not just anecdotal. Faulty forensics, including both 
fraudulent and incompetent analysis, contributed to forty-seven percent 
of the first confirmed wrongful convictions, totaling over 150 cases.115 
Moreover, as the number of wrongful convictions continues to rise as a 
result of subsequent DNA exoneration, many scholars believe this is only 
“the tip of a much larger iceberg.”116 Thus, it is clear that forensic science 
is far from infallible. As Barry Scheck of the Innocence Project and his 
coauthors explain, “[w]hat passes for ‘scientific evidence’ in courtrooms 
frequently goes unchallenged, and carries tremendous weight with jurors 
panning for nuggets of truth in the muddy river of conflicting stories and 
rickety memories. Too often, though, the ‘scientific evidence’ is fool’s 
gold.”117 Forensic science, consequently, can be dangerous because of its 
inherently persuasive nature. Defendants require a strengthened 
confrontation right to combat this danger. 
 
 108. Id. at 140. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 140, 146. 
 114. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful 
Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2009) (explaining that “scientific advances led to Dotson’s 
exoneration, but invalid forensic science testimony had also supported his conviction”). 
 115. The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
causes-wrongful-conviction (last visited Apr. 8, 2016) (explaining that faulty forensics contributed to 154 
cases of the first 325 confirmed wrongful convictions). 
 116. See, e.g., Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 114, at 8. 
 117. Scheck et al., supra note 14, at 141. 
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Because the defense subjected Zain to cross-examination, but still 
failed to expose the fraudulent analysis, it is arguable that confrontation 
is an ineffective tool against forensic science and therefore does not 
warrant additional protections from the Supreme Court. Other scholars 
have advocated alternative methods of control over forensic witnesses, 
including measures such as external audits to monitor the quality and 
proficiency of laboratories,118 and even the complete exclusion of 
evidence from scientific fields deemed unreliable in order to galvanize 
reform.119 While these are excellent additional steps that should be taken 
to guard against faulty forensics and its impact on wrongful convictions, 
the role of cross-examination should not be undervalued. 
As John Henry Wigmore explained, cross-examination is “the 
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”120 This is 
especially true given the central nature of the adversarial system in the 
U.S. justice system.121 The U.S. courts are unlikely to shift the 
responsibility away from the parties to establish the deficiencies of a 
witness’ testimony.122 Thus, if a forensic scientist were to overcome the 
proposed pretrial safeguards, cross-examination would still be needed to 
expose any lies and inconsistencies. Just as Justice Scalia explained in 
Melendez-Diaz, cross-examination is an essential tool for exposing faulty 
forensic science.123 Yet, its effectiveness is greatly undermined if the 
responsible witness is not required to take the stand.124 So, while forensic 
witnesses like Zain should indeed be subject to additional safeguards like 
audits, if unreliable or fraudulent science does make it into the 
courtroom, the defendant should be assured that the responsible witness 
will be subject to the full force of the adversarial system. 
Additionally, cross-examination is a tool that is already available 
and it should therefore be duly protected. While proposed pretrial 
safeguards may deter faulty forensics in the future, criminal defendants 
must rely on their confrontation rights as these proposed safeguards take 
effect. Moreover, confrontation rights are constitutional safeguards, 
 
 118. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate 
Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 163, 163 (2007) (“[Q]uality assurance programs, including proficiency 
testing and external audits, should be mandated.”). 
 119. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Path Forward 
Fraught With Pitfalls, 2 Utah L. Rev. 225, 246 (2010) (“Exclusion is a blunt instrument to try to coerce 
forensic science to reform, but in the end it may be the only one we are left with.”). 
 120. Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Themes, 35 N.C. J. Int’l L. 
& Com. Reg. 387, 393 (2010) (quoting 3 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American 
System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 27 (2d ed. 1923)). 
 121. Id. at 416 (explaining that the United States is unlikely to adopt elements of an inquisitorial 
system that would shift the responsibility from the jury to judges to determine the merits of a forensic 
witness’ testimony). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318–20 (2009). 
 124. Id. 
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meaning they cannot be disregarded or replaced because alternative 
protections exist. Even if additional protections are added, the right to 
confront adverse witnesses must still be ensured. Because the adversarial 
system is essential in the United States125 and is embraced in its 
constitutional precepts, better cross-examination should be pursued in 
tandem with other suggested protections. 
Wrongful convictions not only emphasize the need for cross-
examination to expose potential inaccuracies and fraud among forensic 
scientists, but they also act as a reminder that Sixth Amendment 
protections apply to everyone. The criminal defendants discussed in Part 
IV of this Note are likely perpetrators of horrendous crimes. In fact, in 
People v. Dungo,126 the central issue of the case was not whether Dungo 
strangled and killed his girlfriend, but for how long he strangled her.127 
When met with facts such as these, it might be difficult to remain neutral 
as to inclusion of incriminating evidence, but for such reasons, it is 
essential to keep in mind that the right to confront “witnesses against 
him” is not only Dungo’s right, but is also the right of Woodall and every 
other defendant who retains a presumption of innocence in the face of 
criminal charges.128 
III.  The WILLIAMS Decision and the Resulting Confusion 
Despite the rather straightforward decisions made in the cases 
preceding it, the plurality in Williams v. Illinois generally disregards the 
precedence surrounding surrogate testimony for forensic evidence. Due 
to a flip in the voting composition, the divided Court dramatically shifted 
its position on the admissibility of surrogate testimony for forensic 
science. In Melendez-Diaz, the majority was comprised of Justices Scalia, 
Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg,129 with Justice Thomas joining 
with a concurring opinion.130 While between Melendez-Diaz and the 
decision in Bullcoming the composition of the Court changed, Justice 
Sotomayor and Justice Kagan replacing Justices Souter and Stevens,131 
the voting configuration remained much the same. This normalcy would, 
however, cease to be the case three years later when Williams came 
before the Court. 
 
 125. See supra note 121. 
 126. People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442 (Cal. 2012). 
 127. Id. at 446. 
 128. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452 (1895) (“The law presumes that persons 
charged with crime are innocent until they are proven by competent evidence to be guilty.”). 
 129. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 306 (2009). 
 130. Id. at 329 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I continue to adhere to my position that ‘the 
Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.’”). 
 131. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, Sup. Ct. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
about/members_text.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2016). 
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In Williams, the dissenters in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming 
became the plurality.132 Justice Alito wrote that opinion and was joined 
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Breyer.133 The 
plurality determined the forensic report was nontestimonial because it 
was not presented for the truth of the matter asserted.134 Justice Thomas 
wrote a concurring opinion that disagreed with all aspects of the plurality 
decision, but still found the report nontestimonial because it was 
insufficiently formal.135 Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, 
and Sotomayor dissented and wrote a fierce critique of the plurality and 
the concurring opinion.136 
Thus, between 2011 and 2014 the Court effectively changed its 
position on forensic evidence and surrogate witnesses, and the combined 
opinions of the plurality and concurrence have fostered increased 
confusion regarding the application of the Confrontation Clause.137 
Whereas the testimonial nature of lab reports and the requirement for 
the responsible lab analyst to testify was relatively clear under Melendez-
Diaz and Bullcoming, this shift and the division of the Williams Court 
makes it unclear when forensic evidence is nontestimonial and when the 
use of a surrogate witness is permissible. Consequently, the decision 
substantially reduced defendants’ ability to effectively predict the 
admissibility of forensic evidence. 
A. The Facts 
In Williams, the defendant, Sandy Williams, was convicted of 
aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated robbery, and aggravated 
kidnapping.138 The victim was taken from her car on her way home from 
work and then raped and subsequently robbed.139 After the attack, 
doctors treated her wounds and took a blood sample and a vaginal 
swab.140 Confirming the presence of semen in the sample, the Illinois 
State Police (“ISP”) laboratory sent the vaginal swab to Cellmark 
Diagnostics, an independent laboratory, for DNA testing.141 Cellmark 
returned a report to ISP containing a DNA profile produced from the 
 
 132. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
 133. Id. at 2227. 
 134. Id. at 2228. 
 135. See id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 136. Id. at 2264–77 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 137. See generally Michael H. Graham, Confrontation Clause: Williams Creates “Significant 
Confusion” Prompting California Avoidance, 49 Crim. L. Bull. 1533 (2013) (explaining the confusion 
in the legal landscape that the Williams opinion creates). 
 138. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2231. 
 139. Id. at 2229. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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semen, but at the time of the testing, ISP did not yet suspect Williams of 
the rape.142 
Sandra Lambatos, a forensic specialist at ISP, conducted a computer 
search and found a match to the Cellmark DNA profile.143 However, 
Lambatos neither conducted the initial tests nor observed any of 
Cellmark’s testing.144 The profile match was for a blood sample taken from 
Williams after a previous, unrelated arrest.145 At Williams’ bench trial, the 
prosecution did not call any of the analysts from Cellmark, nor was the 
report admitted into evidence.146 Instead, the prosecution relied only on 
the testimony of forensic witnesses from ISP.147 
Lambatos was among these witnesses, and in her testimony, she 
relied on the Cellmark DNA profile.148 She explained that it is common 
practice to rely on the reports of another expert and, specifically, that the 
ISP regularly relied on Cellmark, an accredited crime lab, to expedite the 
testing process.149 Lambatos testified that, based on her comparison of 
the two profiles, the sample taken from the vaginal swab “matched” 
Williams’ DNA.150 However, the testimony presented by Lambatos, and 
the plurality’s subsequent characterization of her testimony, 
oversimplified the process required to create a DNA sample like the one 
provided by Cellmark.151 
While Lambatos conceded that the sample had been degraded, she 
failed to call attention to the fact that the rape kit sample was a mixture 
containing DNA from both the male attacker and the victim.152 Due to 
the complexity of the sample, DNA mixture analysis requires greater 
subjective interpretation.153 As a result, the Cellmark analysis, like the 
tests in Bullcoming, required both substantial skill and subjective 
determinations to interpret the results. Additionally, Lambatos failed to 
reveal that male profiles other than Williams could have been consistent 
with the vaginal swab mixture.154 While these limitations likely had only a 
minimal effect on the probative value of the evidence, it is the 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 2230. 
 145. Id. at 2229. 
 146. Id. at 2230. 
 147. Id. at 2229–30. 
 148. Id. at 2230. 
 149. See Hanasono, supra note 57, at 8. 
 150. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227. 
 151. See D. H. Kaye, Williams v. Illinois (Part II: More Facts, from Outside the Record, and a 
Question of Ethics), Forensic Sci., Stat. & L. (Dec. 15, 2011), http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/2011/ 
12/williams-v-illinois-part-ii-more-facts.html. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Itiel E. Dror & Greg Hampikian, Subjectivity and Bias in Forensic DNA Mixture Interpretation, 
51 Sci. & Just. 204, 205 (2011). 
 154. Kaye, supra note 151. 
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oversimplification that is problematic.155 For example, showing the 
complexity of the testing process can help a jury recognize the possibility 
of error. In a case of a less accurate match or more fallible testing methods, 
information regarding the complexity of the testing method could keep a 
jury from convicting an innocent person. Despite these dangers, the trial 
court admitted Lambatos’ testimony and the jury convicted Williams, 
which was ultimately upheld by the Court.156 
B. The Division 
As previously noted, the Justices remained divided in Williams as 
they were in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, but the dissent now 
represented the plurality and the majority was now dissenting.157 Justice 
Thomas continued to advocate for the formality distinction, developed in 
Crawford,158 but determined that a signed and detailed report failed to 
give rise to the requisite level of formality.159 With Justice Thomas’ vote, 
the Court upheld Williams’ conviction.160 However, because Justice 
Thomas disagreed with the plurality’s rationale,161 the guiding principle 
for deciding similar cases was left unknown.162 
1. The Plurality 
The plurality of the Court decided the Cellmark report was 
nontestimonial and did not give rise to Sixth Amendment protections.163 
First, the plurality determined that “this form of expert testimony does 
not violate the Confrontation Clause because that provision has no 
application to out-of-court statements that are not offered to prove the 
‘truth of the matter asserted.’”164 Justice Alito maintained that Lambatos 
used the Cellmark report only to establish that it contained a DNA 
profile, and specifically, did not testify as to the accuracy of the profile 
that was used to match Williams’ DNA.165 Accordingly, the report was 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct 2221, 2244 (2012). 
 157. See supra notes 127–34. 
 158. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (“An accuser who makes a formal statement 
to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an 
acquaintance does not.”). 
 159. Williams, 132 S. Ct at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 160. Id. at 2244. 
 161. Id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As I explain below, I share the dissent’s view of the 
plurality’s flawed analysis.”). 
 162. See Hanasono, supra note 57, at 11 (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court leaves state courts, such as 
California’s Supreme Court, with little structured guidance as to the evaluation of out-of-court 
statements sought to be introduced by the prosecution in criminal trials.”). 
 163. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  
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not offered for the truth of what it asserted, but instead was only offered 
for the purpose of producing a match. 
Furthermore, the plurality contended that even if the report had 
been offered in such a way, it would still be admissible because it did not 
target a specific individual.166 Justice Alito explained that “[t]he report 
was sought not for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used against 
petitioner . . . but for the purpose of finding a rapist who was on the 
loose.”167 The testimony, therefore, was not utilized for “accusing a 
targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct.”168 Here, the plurality 
analogized the circumstances to the ongoing emergency in Davis v. 
Washington.169 Like the 911 call in Davis, the primary purpose of the 
Cellmark report was to apprehend a rapist and resolve an ongoing 
emergency.170 Thus, the primary purpose was not to gather evidence against 
Williams to be used at trial; rather, it was to apprehend a dangerous 
criminal.171 
2. The Concurrence 
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas agreed that Lambatos’ 
testimony did not infringe on Williams’ Sixth Amendment right,172 yet 
offered a completely different rationale than the plurality. Justice 
Thomas asserted that the Cellmark report “lack[ed] the solemnity of an 
affidavit or deposition” because it was “neither a sworn nor a certified 
declaration of fact.”173 For this reason, he concluded that the report was 
not testimonial and did not give rise to Sixth Amendment protections.174 
Justice Thomas went on to disagree with the remainder of the 
plurality’s decision, especially their claim that the statements were not 
introduced for the truth of the matter asserted.175 He stressed that 
“statements introduced to explain the basis of an expert’s opinion are not 
introduced for a plausible nonhearsay purpose,”176 and added that 
“[t]here is no meaningful distinction between disclosing an out-of-court 
statement so that the factfinder may evaluate the expert’s opinion and 
disclosing that statement for its truth.”177 Here, Lambatos relied on the 
Cellmark report for its truth to establish the DNA match and, therefore, 
 
 166. Id. at 2243. 
 167. Id. at 2228. 
 168. Id. at 2242. 
 169. Id. at 2243. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 173. Id. at 2260. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 2257–58. 
 176. Id. at 2257. 
 177. Id. 
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by disclosing her evaluation of that report she disclosed the report for its 
truth—evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible without 
opportunity for cross-examination.178 In a similar fashion, Justice Thomas 
rejected the plurality’s “targeted individual” rationale and asserted that 
this approach “lacks any grounding in constitutional text, in history, or in 
logic.”179 With such biting remarks, Justice Thomas’ concurrence, as 
Justice Kagan keenly and repeatedly pointed out,180 resembled the 
dissent much more than it resembled any form of agreement with the 
plurality. 
3. The Dissent 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Kagan addressed and rejected the 
plurality’s contention that the Cellmark report was not offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted, stating that “when a witness, expert or 
otherwise, repeats an out-of-court statement as the basis for a 
conclusion . . . the statement’s utility is then dependent on its truth.”181 
She explained that “[i]f the statement is true, then the conclusion based 
on it is probably true; if not, not.”182 Consequently, Justice Kagan 
expounded, “to determine the validity of the witness’ conclusion, the 
factfinder must assess the truth of the out-of-court statement on which it 
relies.”183 Accordingly, because Lambatos relied on the truth of the 
Cellmark report to form her conclusions as to the existence of a match, 
the prosecution essentially submitted the substance of that report.184 With 
“a wink and a nod,” Justice Kagan asserted, the prosecution attempted to 
circumvent the Confrontation Clause by entering only Lambatos’ 
testimony.185 Here, the dissent reiterated concerns about incompetent 
analysts and argued that the plurality’s decision by admitting surrogate 
testimony allowed these dangers to go unaddressed.186 
Additionally, Justice Kagan agreed with Justice Thomas that the 
plurality’s targeted individual test lacked proper precedential 
foundation.187 The dissent declared, “[w]here that test comes from is 
anyone’s guess. . . . None of our cases has ever suggested that . . . the 
statement must be meant to accuse a previously identified individual.”188 
Additionally, the plurality’s analogy to an ongoing emergency stretched 
 
 178. Id. at 2258. 
 179. Id. at 2262. 
 180. See, e.g., id. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 181. Id. at 2268–69. 
 182. Id. at 2268. 
 183. Id. at 2268–69. 
 184. See id. at 2269–70. 
 185. Id. at 2270. 
 186. Id. at 2272. 
 187. Id. at 2273. 
 188. Id. at 2273–74. 
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the doctrine too far, as the corresponding cases never address the routine 
practices of laboratory analysts.189 Consequently, without requiring the 
trial court to give Williams the opportunity to confront the Cellmark 
analyst, the plurality’s decision allowed the prosecution to continue to 
circumvent the Confrontation Clause despite the testimonial nature of 
the out-of-court statement.190 
While the dissent considered Justice Thomas’ argument that the 
Cellmark report was insufficiently formal,191 Justice Kagan asserted that 
Justice Thomas’ opinion, if adopted, “would turn the Confrontation 
Clause into a constitutional gee-gaw—nice for show, but of little 
value.”192 Specifically, prosecutors could avoid confrontation by using the 
right kind of forms and particular language.193 As Justice Kagan stated, 
prosecutors can merely find the “magic words” to prevent reports from 
being deemed “certified.”194 As a result, the Confrontation Clause would 
be reduced to an insignificant procedural obstacle that could be easily 
avoided by, for example, reducing the number of signatures on the 
report. 
C. The Confusion 
With Justice Thomas’ concurrence, a total of five Justices rejected 
the idea that statements, like those contained in the Cellmark report, are 
not hearsay when offered to show the basis for the expert’s opinion. 
Additionally, the same five Justices disagreed with the idea that the 
Confrontation Clause does not apply to statements gathered for 
prosecution when there is no individualized suspect. As Justice Kagan 
pointed out, however, no five Justices agreed with any of the plurality’s 
interpretations of the testimonial standard.195 Following the decision, it 
could be gleaned that testimony might be admissible, as it was in 
Williams, if it satisfies the plurality’s nontargeted individual test and fails 
to have the requisite number of signatures and certifications that Justice 
Thomas demands for formality. Thus, lower courts are left wondering 
where the majority of the Court truly lies. 
Just as Justice Kagan predicted, the Williams decision has 
consequently left “significant confusion in [its] wake.”196 As the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals noted in United States v. Maxwell, “the Court’s 
 
 189. Id. at 2274. 
 190. Id. at 2272 (“The plurality thus would countenance the Constitution’s circumvention.”). 
 191. Id. at 2276. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See id. at 2272 (“What a neat trick—but really, what a way to run a criminal justice system. No 
wonder five Justices reject it.”). 
 196. Id. at 2277. 
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4-1-4 division left no clear guidance about how exactly an expert must 
phrase its testimony about the results of testing performed by another 
analyst in order for the testimony to be admissible.”197 Consequently, 
courts have utilized various methods of interpretation to deal with 
confusion in the aftermath of Williams. Some have decided that Williams 
is only binding in its narrow circumstances and results,198 while others 
have chosen to ignore the Williams decision all together. For example, in 
United States v. James, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined 
that Williams created no binding precedent.199 Others, notably state 
courts, have resorted to more mathematical methods. 
IV.  A Comparative Look at State Responses 
Similarly frustrated by the Williams decision, some state courts have 
found a mathematical form of abiding by the Court’s vague ruling, 
predicting the voting of each Justice until a principle that will garner five 
votes is discovered.200 As Michael H. Graham noted in his article, “[i]t is 
self-evident from recent reported California Supreme Court opinions 
that the California Supreme Court has simply run out of patience with 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s inability to fashion a coherent logical, practical 
interpretation of the confrontation clause.”201 To manage this confusion 
over the admissibility of surrogate testimony for autopsy reports, the 
California Supreme Court and the New Mexico Supreme Court 
implemented a system referred to, for the purposes of this Note, as head-
counting.202 Specifically, head-counting occurs when the courts determine 
the admissibility of testimony by calculating whether five or more U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices would agree to the inclusion of specific testimony. 
The following Subparts explore New Mexico’s and California’s application 
of Williams and analyze their results. 
 
 197. United States v. Maxwell, 724 F.3d 724, 727 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 198. See Hanasono, supra note 57, at 10–11 (exploring the various interpretations of the Williams 
decision). 
 199. See United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 200. Because a bare majority of the Court determines the outcome of the case head counting or 
“counting noses” appears to be generally accepted and widely used. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Five to 
Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?, 123 Yale L.J. 1692, 1703 n.39, 1724 (2014) (quoting 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Are Judges Really More Principled than Voters?, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 37, 58–59 
(2002)) (“Because the Justices are political equals: we assess the quality of argument by counting 
noses.”). But, as demonstrated by the decisions in Dungo and Naverette, this method can lead to 
contradictory results. 
 201. Graham, supra note 137, at 1541. 
 202. See State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 437 (N.M. 2013); People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 455–56 
(Cal. 2012) (Chin, J., concurring). 
Jones_15 (Langone).DOCX (Do Not Delete) 5/10/2016  4:21 PM 
May 2016]    CONFRONTING WILLIAMS 1109 
A. PEOPLE V. DUNGO 
In Dungo, the defendant was charged with the murder of his 
girlfriend Lucinda Correia Pina.203 The defendant admitted to the crime, 
but argued at trial that he killed her in the heat of passion and without 
malice, and as a result204 the prosecution offered the testimony of forensic 
pathologist Robert Lawrence to refute this claim.205 Lawrence testified 
that Pina had died of “asphyxia caused by strangulation,”206 further 
explaining that because Pina’s hyoid bone—the bone located in front of 
the neck and between the lower jaw and the larynx207—was not fractured, 
she had in fact been continuously strangled for “more than two 
minutes.”208 With this information, the prosecution argued that the 
defendant “could not have been acting in the heat of passion for that length 
of time and that therefore the killing was murder rather than 
manslaughter.”209 
Lawrence, however, did not conduct the autopsy; rather, pathologist 
George Bolduc performed the autopsy on Pina’s body.210 The prosecution 
did not indicate that Bolduc was unavailable to testify at trial211 and, 
moreover, it was revealed during a pretrial evidentiary hearing that 
Bolduc had been fired from his position in Kern County and had 
resigned from Orange County “under a cloud.”212 In a corresponding 
footnote, the California Supreme Court surreptitiously explained that 
“under a cloud” meant that Bolduc was suspected of “basing his 
conclusion regarding the cause of death on a police report rather than on 
medical evidence.”213 Although the trial judge permitted the defendant to 
cross-examine Lawrence about Bolduc’s qualifications,214 confronting a 
credible surrogate witness would likely not have the same impact as 
crossing the pathologist directly responsible for producing fraudulent 
work. 
Ultimately, the majority of the California Supreme Court determined 
that the information relayed by Lawrence was informal and that the 
primary purpose of the autopsy was not for criminal investigation.215 First, 
 
 203. Dungo, 286 P.3d at 444–45. 
 204. Id. at 445–46. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id. at 446. 
 207. Hyoid Bone, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/279422/ 
hyoid-bone (last visited Apr. 8, 2016). 
 208. Dungo, 286 P.3d at 446. 
 209. Id. at 445. 
 210. Id.  
 211. Id.  
 212. Id. at 445–46. 
 213. Id. at 445 n.2. 
 214. Id. at 446. 
 215. Id. at 450. 
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the court explained that statements that record objective facts are less 
formal than statements that introduce a pathologist’s conclusions.216 
Here, the court reasoned that Bolduc’s report was more appropriately 
categorized as observations rather than conclusions.217 In her 
concurrence, Justice Werdegar further emphasized that the autopsy 
report was not “sworn or certified.”218 Second, the court maintained that 
the autopsy was not prepared with the primary purpose of prosecution, 
but rather in accordance with the governing statute that requires 
inquiries into the cause of death for a number of various circumstances.219 
The court explained that “the scope of the coroner’s statutory duty to 
investigate is the same, regardless of whether the death resulted from 
criminal activity.”220 The autopsy report, therefore, had several purposes, 
including but not limited to the use in prosecution.221 
The court maintained that the defendant did not have the right to 
confront Bolduc, the actual preparer of the autopsy,222 and consequently, 
Dungo’s confrontation right had not been violated.223 As Justice Chin 
clearly asserted, “[i]t took a combination of two opinions [the Williams 
plurality and Justice Thomas’ concurrence]—each containing quite 
different reasoning—to achieve the majority result.”224 The court applied 
a test that would satisfy one Justice and four Justices separately, but 
would never satisfy a uniform majority of the Supreme Court. As a 
consequence of the divided Williams Court, the decision in Dungo 
represents a somewhat piecemeal application of the Confrontation 
Clause doctrine. 
In her dissent, Justice Corrigan attacked the foundation of the 
majority’s decision by sharply explaining that the majority’s distinction 
between observations and conclusions was previously rejected in 
Bullcoming.225 Additionally, she asserted that, while the primary purpose 
of some autopsies may not be prosecutorial, other circumstances may 
well give rise to the production of testimonial statements.226 The question 
 
 216. Id. at 449. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 452 (Werdegar, J., concurring). 
 219. Id. at 450; see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 27291 (West 2016) (“It shall be the duty of the coroner to 
inquire into and determine the circumstances, manner, and cause of all violent, sudden, or unusual 
deaths. . . .”).  
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 444. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 455 (Chin, J., concurring); see also id. at 456 (“[W]e must identify and apply a test which 
satisfies the requirement of both Justice [Alito’s] plurality opinion and Justice [Thomas’s] 
concurrence.”). 
 225. Id. at 463 (Corrigan, J., dissenting). 
 226. Id. at 466. 
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then was whether Bolduc’s report was testimonial.227 In response to this, 
due in large part to the presence of the police during the autopsy, Justice 
Corrigan determined that Bolduc’s primary purpose was to prepare 
statements for use in a criminal trial.228 Accordingly, she concluded that 
the testimony violated the Confrontation Clause.229 
B. STATE V. NAVARETTE 
In a similar case in New Mexico, Reylando Ornelas was shot and 
killed while leaning into the open driver’s side window of a parked car.230 
Navarette, who was in the passenger’s seat of the car during the incident, 
claimed that the driver was the shooter.231 The prosecution called Dr. 
Ross Zumwalt to testify as to the cause and manner of death,232 even 
though Dr. Mary Dudley performed the autopsy and Zumwalt “neither 
participated nor observed Dr. Dudley perform the autopsy.”233 Despite 
Zumwalt’s absence from the autopsy procedure, he testified that Dudley 
“followed the standard procedure for performing autopsies.”234 
Additionally, Zumwalt concluded, based on the autopsy report and the 
photographs of the body, that due to the absence of soot and stippling, 
the gun was not within two feet of Ornelas when the shooter fired the 
gun.235 With this testimony, the prosecution argued that the shooter could 
not have been the driver.236 
In this case, the New Mexico Supreme Court was explicit about its 
head-count technique. The court explained, “[o]ur examination of 
Crawford and its progeny reveals that at least five justices of the [U.S.] 
Supreme Court have agreed upon the following principles that we 
conclude are essential to a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
analysis.”237 The opinion then methodically introduced each principle, 
which the court believed had gained the favor of five Justices. The U.S. 
Supreme Court established five of these principles prior to Williams.238 
To discern the other principles, as in Dungo, the Court attempted to 
reconcile the division of the Williams Court.239 Here, rather than utilizing 
the plurality and the concurring opinion in Williams, the New Mexico 
 
 227. Id.  
 228. Id. at 466–67. 
 229. Id. 
 230. State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 436 (N.M. 2013). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 437. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 437–39 (establishing the principles identified as the first, second, third, fifth, and sixth). 
 239. Id. at 439. 
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Supreme Court ultimately followed only those principles accepted by a 
uniform majority of the U.S. Supreme Court. In fact, the court in 
Navarette discussed three principles established by taking the dissenting 
and concurring opinion of the Williams decision.240 
The first of these principles asserts that “even if a statement (in this 
case, a forensic report), does not target a specific individual, the 
statement may still be testimonial.”241 In Williams, both Justices Thomas 
and Kagan rejected the plurality’s choice to make reports nontestimonial 
if they were not targeted at a specific individual.242 Second, “the fact that 
an out-of-court statement (in this case, the forensic report) is not 
inherently inculpatory does not make it nontestimonial.”243 Again in 
Williams, both Justices Kagan and Thomas refused to recognize the 
distinction between “inherently inculpatory” statements and those that 
are “merely helpful.”244 Justice Kagan asserted that the plurality could 
not “gain any purchase from the idea that a DNA profile is not 
inherently inculpatory.”245 Third, “an out-of-court statement that is 
disclosed to the fact-finder as the basis for an expert’s opinion is offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted.”246 The dissenting opinion and Justice 
Thomas’ concurring opinion agreed that the report, which acted as the 
basis of the testifying witness’ knowledge, was in fact offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted.247 
Relying on these principles, the court determined that Zumwalt’s in-
court statements related testimonial hearsay and therefore, violated 
Navarette’s confrontation right.248 The court explained that it was self-
evident that the statements Dudley made in the autopsy report were 
prepared for use at trial.249 The controlling New Mexico statutes, section 
24-11-5 and section 24-11-8, provided that “any . . . sudden, violent or 
untimely death[,] . . . the cause of which is unknown, shall [be] report[ed] 
. . . to law enforcement,”250 and a “medical investigator shall promptly 
report his findings . . . to the district attorney in each death 
investigated.”251 As a result, Dudley should have reasonably foreseen the 
 
 240. Id. at 438–39. 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id. at 439. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2274 n.5 (2012). 
 246. Navarette, 294 P.3d at 439. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 444. 
 249. Id. at 440. 
 250. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-11-5 (West 2016). 
 251. Id. § 24-11-8. 
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use of the report at trial.252 Consequently, the statements were 
testimonial and inadmissible unless Dudley testified at trial.253 
C. The Comparison 
In both Dungo and Navarette, surrogate witnesses presented the 
results of autopsies performed by other forensic pathologists,254 yet the 
courts came to contrary results regarding the admissibility of that 
testimony. In Dungo, the court deemed the testimony of the surrogate 
witness sufficient255 and in Navarette, the court concluded that the 
surrogate testimony violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.256 
The circumstances of these cases are quite similar, both pathology 
reports were similarly formal and prepared for trial, and both cases 
presented dangers the Court sought to restrict prior to the Williams 
decision, namely, the danger of deficient or fraudulent forensic science. 
First, the intent for prosecution is essentially the same in both cases. 
The statutes in California and New Mexico both require autopsies be 
performed in the event of a violent death.257 While, as the court noted, 
the California Government Code requires autopsy reports in a variety of 
circumstances, irregularity or violence appear to be the underlying 
factors for the listed conditions.258 For example, the first lines read: “It shall 
be the duty of the coroner to inquire into and determine the circumstances, 
manner, and cause of all violent, sudden, or unusual deaths.”259 
Consequently, similar to the explicit requirement in the New Mexico 
statute, the California Code implicitly mandates autopsies in criminal 
situations. Therefore, although there may be other purposes for determining 
the cause and manner of death, the primary purpose of the autopsy reports 
in both of these cases appear to be use in prosecution. 
Moreover, autopsies are important tools for prosecution in 
general.260 In fact, in homicide cases, the autopsy is typically the central 
piece of incriminating evidence.261 A pathologist could plainly predict, 
especially in a case of a violent death through strangulation or a gunshot 
wound, the use of that autopsy report in a criminal prosecution. 
Consequently, regardless of the individual circumstances of a case, 
 
 252. Navarette, 294 P.3d at 441. 
 253. Id. at 444. 
 254. See id. at 436; see also People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 445–46 (Cal. 2012). 
 255. Dungo, 286 P.3d at 444. 
 256. Navarette, 294 P.3d at 444. 
 257. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 27491 (West 2016); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-11-5 (West 2016). 
 258. Cal. Gov’t Code § 27491 (West 2016). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Andrew Higley, Tales of the Dead: Why Autopsy Reports Should Be Classified as Testimonial 
Statements Under the Confrontation Clause, 48 New. Eng. L. Rev. 171, 172 (2013). 
 261. Id. 
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autopsy reports appear to inherently fall within the category of 
foreseeable use at trial. 
Second, the reports are also similarly formal. As Justice Corrigan 
outlines in her dissent, Bolduc’s autopsy report bore the badge of the San 
Joaquin County Sheriff, had “Coroner’s Autopsy Report” on the upper 
right of every page, and included Bolduc’s name at the bottom of each 
page.262 Further, the physical report had the appearance of formality 
similar to that described in Bullcoming.263 Because the New Mexico 
Supreme Court justices focused on the primary purpose of the autopsy 
report, the opinion does not describe in detail the appearance of the report. 
However, the statements within the report as to the manner and cause of 
death are similar to those produced by Bolduc.264 The statements, therefore, 
are likely similar in formality. 
Finally, both cases represent the dangers of forensic evidence that 
the Court worked to guard against. In Melendez-Diaz, Justice Scalia 
asserted that confrontation could expose analysts with improper or 
insufficient training and any deficiencies in judgment.265 Justice Ginsburg 
further endorsed this reasoning in Bullcoming, explaining that “surrogate 
testimony [could not] expose any lapses or lies on the certifying analyst’s 
part.”266 The Court in these cases worked to guard against forensic 
evidence that might have deficiencies due to the analyst’s faulty judgment 
or mistaken interpretations, as might have been the case with Navarette. 
In Navarette, the pathologist, Zumwalt, made conclusions as to the 
position of the shooter based on the absence of stippling and soot.267 
Stippling “consists of multiple punctate abrasions of the skin due to the 
impact of small fragments of foreign material”268 and has been subject to 
scientific critiques.269 For example, some critics have stated that 
“[g]unpowder residue is usually associated with a distance of contact up 
to 12 in[ches]. The determination of distance by counting burned and 
unburned powder indentations is arbitrary at best.”270 Thus, a determination 
as to the distance at which a gun was fired can require a great deal of 
subjective interpretation. In fact, the court in Navarette conceded that 
 
 262. People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 463–64 (Cal. 2012) (Corrigan, J., dissenting). 
 263. Id. at 464. 
 264. Compare id. at 446 (majority opinion) (explaining that the autopsy report contained 
photographs and a description of the body), and State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 437 (N.M. 2013) 
(stating that the autopsy report contained photographs and a description of the victim’s injuries). 
 265. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 320 (2009). 
 266. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2011). 
 267. Navarette, 294 P.3d at 437. 
 268. Vincent J.M. Di Maio, Gunshot Wounds: Practical Aspects of Firearms, Ballistics, and 
Forensic Techniques 103 (2d ed. 1999). 
 269. John Louis Larsen & Arthur H. Borchers, Handguns: Range of Fire and Gunpowder Stippling, 
Evidence Tech. Mag. (2008), http://www.evidencemagazine.com/index.php?option=com_content&task= 
view&id=1119. 
 270. Id. 
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exact fact.271 Stippling analysis, therefore, presents substantial risk of 
deficiencies, both in training and judgment, just as Justice Scalia 
discussed in Melendez-Diaz.272 
Any dangers of incompetence in Dungo, on the other hand, are not 
as apparent. Unlike Navarette, as the court in Dungo contended, the 
determination of whether a bone is broken requires less interpretation 
and more objective observations.273 Something such as a broken bone, for 
example, is less likely to be incorrectly or incompetently analyzed. 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the Confrontation 
Clause protects defendants against fraudulent attacks as well as 
incompetent ones. For instance, in Melendez-Diaz, Justice Scalia 
contended that the Confrontation Clause was designed to awaken the 
conscience of fraudulent witnesses.274 
So, though the subjective interpretation required in Dungo is less 
than that in Navarette, this does not eliminate the danger of fraud. In 
Dungo, the danger of fraudulent reports seems substantially higher than 
in Navarette. While there was no evidence of fraud in Dungo, the 
suspicious history of Bolduc275 raised concerns of repeated questionable 
practices, information that would have been important to introduce to 
the jury. In this way, the dangers of testimonial hearsay that the 
Confrontation Clause is specifically designed to inhibit are present in 
both cases.276 
Overall, despite the fact that Navarette and Dungo presented similar 
circumstances and posed similar hearsay dangers, the cases produced 
contrary results. Quite simply, the cases demonstrate that Williams can 
be used in a multitude of ways. Courts can choose from a variety of 
different interpretations to base their opinions. Thus, the question is not 
how can Williams be used, but rather, how should it be used. 
V.  Limiting the Impact of the WILLIAMS Decision 
By relying on the plurality’s rationale and Justice Thomas’ 
concurrence, the court in Dungo failed to follow principles established by 
the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court. Rather, the Dungo court 
satisfied four Justices and one Justice separately and, consequently, 
overemphasized the importance of those conflicting opinions, 
particularly by exaggerating the significance of formality. The plurality 
and concurring opinions not only lack majority support, but also fail to 
address the dangers of forensic science that the Court intended to 
 
 271. Navarette, 294 P.3d at 443. 
 272. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 320 (2009). 
 273. People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 449 (Cal. 2012). 
 274. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318. 
 275. Dungo, 286 P.3d at 445–46. 
 276. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318–20. 
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safeguard against via the exclusion of surrogate testimony. Specifically, it 
fails to protect against those dangers that lead to wrongful convictions. 
First, formality “will not guarantee honesty, proficiency, or 
methodology.”277 The number of labels or signatures, in other words, 
cannot prevent incompetent or fraudulent work. Certification does not 
“make any laboratory technician infallible.”278 Second, ongoing 
emergencies like the 911 call in Davis may have greater assurances of 
honesty because they are not provided for trial but seek aid in dangerous 
circumstances. Yet the “ongoing emergency” represented in Williams is 
not similarly situated. There, the forensic analyst had ample time to 
make mistakes or lie. Finally, Lambatos’ analysis relied on the accuracy 
of the Cellmark report and consequently her testimony as to the 
existence of a match, affirmed that accuracy for the jury. As Justice 
Kagan explained, “[i]f the statement is true, then the conclusion based on 
it is probably true; if not, not.”279 However, Lambatos’ testimony alone 
does not demonstrate the quality or honesty of the Cellmark report. 
Only by cross-examining the preparer of the Cellmark report and the 
individual who established the subsequent match could the defendant 
establish if one or the other engaged in fraudulent acts during the 
production of the material. Thus, the rationales supported by the 
plurality and concurrence inadequately protect defendants from 
incompetent or fraudulent forensic evidence. 
As a result, courts should act to limit the impact of the Williams’ 
plurality and concurring opinion by relying on those principles truly 
supported by a majority of the Court. In the context of forensic science 
and surrogate witnesses, this requires that defendants be afforded the 
right to confront analysts directly responsible for the production of 
evidentiary materials, whether those materials are used to directly accuse 
the defendant or indirectly implicate the defendant through comparative 
processes like DNA matching. By adhering to this majority, lower courts 
can ensure that the principles followed will protect the Confrontation 
Clause. 
Overall, if Williams v. Illinois is to be followed at all,280 it should be 
treated as a narrow exception, not the rule. Instead, emphasis should be 
placed on principles supported prior to Williams and those standards 
within Williams that were supported by five unified Justices, namely 
those principles identified by the dissent. 
 
 277. See Hanasono, supra note 57, at 19. 
 278. Id. at 20. 
 279. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2268 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 280. See, e.g., United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (determining that Williams 
created no binding precedent). 
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Conclusion 
In general, courts are often leery of excluding evidence.281 What is 
more, they are particularly hesitant to exclude autopsy reports for fear of 
creating a “statute of limitations on murder.”282 Additionally, as a result 
of the Williams decision, courts have been forced to create piecemeal 
standards for the Confrontation Clause. They must now pick and choose 
standards that they hope will be upheld. For example in People v. 
Dungo, the court chose principles introduced in Williams that only have 
the support of four Justices, or perhaps even just one Justice, in order to 
admit the condemning evidence. 
As a consequence, the U.S. Supreme Court has left defendants 
vulnerable to inconsistent applications of the Sixth Amendment and 
perhaps greater inclusion of faulty forensic science. Depending on what 
state or district a defendant is in, she may be protected by a substantially 
weaker confrontation right than if she happened to be somewhere else. 
This approach does not sufficiently guard against the hearsay dangers 
addressed in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. Nor does this approach 
protect innocent defendants from wrongful convictions. Therefore, while 
the cutting comments that are rife in the dissent’s opinion make the 
Williams case interesting to read, the overwhelming confusion created by 
this decision necessitates a second look. Hopefully future decisions from 
the Supreme Court will not only clarify the current confusion but also 
reinforce the Confrontation Clause, as its impact has been significantly 
diminished with the varying applications of Williams. 
In the interim, however, courts should employ restraint. Rather than 
overemphasizing the formality requirement championed by Justice 
Thomas, as California did in People v. Dungo, courts should follow the 
lead of New Mexico as in State v. Navarette. That is, they should err on 
the side of exclusion and protecting the defendant’s confrontation rights 
by focusing on the rationales agreed to by five Justices. This will help to 
preserve the force of the Confrontation Clause and stop it from 
becoming a simple gee-gaw. 
  
 
 281. See Douglass, supra note 5, at 220. 
 282. Ginsberg, supra note 10, at 119. 
Jones_15 (Langone).DOCX (Do Not Delete) 5/10/2016 4:21 PM 
1118 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1087 
*** 
